Introduction
Using NXM incentives to boost rewards for long-term stakeholders was briefly explored about a year ago. Nexus will work best, and will scale best, when it has lots of members who are focussed on the long term. Therefore, it would be beneficial to introduce a mechanism to gain greater alignment over longer time frames.
(link to original proposal : Long Term NXM Bonuses)
Overall goals:
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use some form of locking mechanism to create a long term aligned group, this could also be linked to staking.
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long term aligned group to take over Advisory Board powers once established & viable (listing new risks, managing correlation issues, managing total capacity risk, burning fraudulent claims assessors)
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reward them with additional NXM, short-med term this could come from buyback, longer term it could be calibrated occasionally (eg once a year) to balance with burns from the sell spread or it could be simply inflationary.
Implementation Options
There are quite a few options here and some of them depend on the precise detail behind the V2 staking implementation.
Regardless of the exact implementation, the biggest strategic question is if we keep the Long-Term Aligned Group relatively small and more technically focused or wider with a significant capital like component (e.g. like “ve” token models). If the former, the amount of wNXM used will not need to be that large, if the latter then it would be significant.
The original proposal suggested a simple linear bonus system based on MCR%, but there are now more established models with proven success based on governance locking and boosted rewards for providing other services to the platform.
Pros & Cons
Key Benefits:
- Provides a potential path to greater decentralisation by having a long term aligned subgroup that could perform actions currently performed by the Advisory Board.
- Attracts more wNXM back into the mutual to access bonuses.
- Greater incentive to re-capitalise the pool in case of large claims if rewards based on current MCR%.
Potential Downsides:
- We end up with an implementation that backfires compared to the original aims.
- Existing long term holders access NXM bonuses but nothing significant changes regarding the operation of the mutual, resulting in ‘wasting’ wNXM.
- If based on current MCR%, implementation fails to provide meaningful enough incentives regarding recapitalisation.
- Implementation will take time and resources away from core development team.